First  Chapter  from  the  Secret  History  of  the  War. 


Philadelphia,  September  27,  1864. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  : — 

Our  acquaintance  and  all  of  the  relations  that  have  ever  existed  between  us  are  confined 
to  two  or  three  accidental  meetings ;  at  one  of  which  you  were  pleased  to  refer  to  the  lasting 
impression  made  upon  you  when  a  poor  boy  by  the  kindness  of  my  father,  who  always  took 
you  by  the  hand  and  gave  you  cheering,  friendly  words  of  encouragement  and  advice.  You 
were  pleased  to  acknowledge  to  the  son,  the  kind  and  valuable  influences  received  by  you  from 
the  father,  and  to  proffer  your  friendly  services  whenever  they  would  be  acceptable. 

Under  the  above  circumstances,  you  prepared  for  me  and  my  friends  no  ordinary  surprise 
when  you  deliberately  composed,  delivered,  and  published  in  The  Press ,  of  the  23d  inst.,  a 
voluntary  unprovoked  attack  upon  me  in  the  following  words  : — 

“It  got  out  that  the  President  was  determined  to  have  the  army  moved,  and  it  was  found 
that  General  McClellan  had  no  plan;  and  here  I  may  state  that  we  owe  the  Peninsula  cam¬ 
paign  to  those  distinguished  Senators,  Latham  of  California,  and  Rice  of  Minnesota,  and  a 
brigadier  in  the  column  of  Joseph  Hooker.  Gen.  McClellan’s  plan  was  concocted  by  others, 
and  put  into  his  hands.  It  was  agreed  on  in  a  council  of  war.  That  plan  was  submitted  to 
the  President.  It  was  submitted  in  the  presence  of  Secretary  Stanton.  Stanton  put  them 
through  a  strict  course-  of  examination.  One  General,  Blenker,  owned  that  he  did  not  under¬ 
stand  the  plan,  but  would  sustain  it,  as  he  thought  he  had  to  obey  the  mandates  of  his  chief. 
General  Naglee  was  one  of  those  present,  and  Stanton  observed  that  he  had  but  one  star. 

‘  Sir,’  said  Mr.  Stanton,  ‘  you  have  no  right  here  !’  ‘  I  am  representing  General  Hooker,’  said 

he.  It  was  afterwards  found  out  that  General  Naglee  was  absent  without  leave,  and  that 
fighting  Joe  Hooker  knew  nothing  of  the  council.”  [Applause.] 

Now,  my  dear  sir,  this  statement  is  simply  false,  and  on  the  part  of  your  friend,  Mr.  Edwin 
M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War,  maliciously  false. 

The  Peninsular  campaign  was  not  indicated  by  “  Senators  Latham  of  California,  and  Rice 
of  Minnesota,  and  a  brigadier  in  the  column  of  Joseph  Hooker,”  as  asserted  by  you.  General 
Naglee  was  at  Washington  with  proper  leave,  and  with  the  full  knowledge  of  General  Hooker, 
and  was  a  member  of  the  council  of  war  by  direction  of  General  McClellan,  to  represent  the 
division  of  the  army  at  Budd’s  Ferry,  in  the  absence  of  General  Hooker,  who  was  too  far 
removed  from  Washington  to  be  present.  And  unfortunately  for  the  veracity  of  Mr.  Stanton, 
the  impertinent  remarks  which  you  ascribe  to  him  could  not  have  been  made,  for  there  were 
no  officers  of  the  council  of  war  entitled  at  that  time  to  more  than  one  star. 

Now,  Judge,  you  know,  or  should  know,  that  the  reputation  of  Mr.  Stanton  for  truth  and 
veracity  is  not  above  suspicion,  and  that  you  may  well  believe  anything  that  may  be  said 
regarding  his  great  incivility  and  rudeness,  for,  not  excepting  yourself,  I  have  never  seen  or 
heard  of  an  officer  or  civilian  who  did  not  condemn  him  for  the  u.tter  want  of  all  of  the 
requisites  of  a  gentleman. 

This  is  not  the  first  time  Mr.  Stanton  has  been  guilty  of  the  most  deliberate,  malicious 
misrepresentation,  and  for  your  gratification  I  will  relate  an  instance  that  occurred  upon  my 
arrival  in  Washington,  immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  “  the  Seven  Bays’  Fight,”  in  the 
beginning  of  J uly  of  1862,  and  when  I  was  surprised  to  learn  that  during  the  continuance  of 
that  desperate  struggle,  and  during  the  time  of  dreadful  suspense,  whilst  nothing  could  be 
heard  of  General  McClellan  and  his  gallant  army,  Mr.  Stanton  had  everywhere  denounced 
General  McClellan  as  a  traitor  to  his  country,  and  as  incapable  of  commanding  a  regiment. 
I  learned  this  from  a  number  of  the  members  of  Congress,  who  were  astonished  and  con¬ 
founded,  and  who  with  pain  eagerly  sought  from  me  some  explanation  of  such  extraordinary 
conduct.  I  could  render  them  no  satisfaction,  but  reported  the  circumstances  to  General 
McClellan,  upon  my  arrival  at  his  headquarters  on  the  following  day,  the  8th  of  July.  His 
surprise,  Judge,  was  greater  than  mine;  without  uttering  a  word,  he  turned  to  his  portfolio, 
took  from  it  a  letter  which  he  placed  before  me,  and  said  :  “  Read  that ;  I  have  just  received 
it  from  Mr.  Stanton.” 

With  his  consent,  I  made  a  copy  of  the  letter,  and,  returning  to  Washington,  placed  it  in 
the  hands  of  those  who  had  heard  the  denunciations  of  Mr.  Stanton,  and  who  had  advised  me 
of  them.  They  desired  to  read  it  to  the  Senate,  and  to  publish  the  outrage  and  the  vindica¬ 
tion,  and  they  telegraphed  to  Gen.  McClellan  for  his  permission,  which  he  declined  to  give 
them.  The  following  is  a  copy  of  the  letter: — 

War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C.,  July  5,  1862. 

Dear  General:  I  had  a  talk  with  General  Marcy,  and  meant  to  have  written  you  by  him, 
but  am  called  to  the  country,  where  Mrs.  Stanton  is  with  her  children,  to  see  one  of  them  die. 
I  can,  therefore,  only  say,  my  dear  General,  in  this  brief  moment,  that  there  is  no  cause  in  my 
heart  or  conduct  for  the  cloud  that  wicked  men  have  raised  between  us  for  their  own  base 
and  selfish  purposes.  No  man  had  ever  a  truer  friend  than  I  have  been  to  you,  and  shall  con¬ 
tinue  to  be.  You  are  seldom  absent  from  my  thoughts,  and  I  am  ready  to  make  any  sacrifice 
to  aid  you.  Time  allows  me  ter  say  no  more  than  that  1  pray  Almighty  God  to  deliver  you 
and  your  army  from  all  peril,  and  lead  you  on  to  victory. 

Yours,  truly, 


Edwin  M.  Stanton. 


2 


Now,  Judge,  what  think  you  of  this  man,  who,  made  Secretary  of  "War  by  the  request  and 
influence  of  Gen.  McClellan,  was  vilifying  and  abusing  and  uttering  falsehoods  against  him, 
and  who  could  at  the  same  time  sit  down  and  deliberately  write  such  a  letter  ? 

"You  have  referred  to  the  council  of  war  held  in  Washington  in  March  of  1862.  Every  - 
effort  has  been  made,  in  vain,  to  bring  the  proceedings  of  that  council  before  the  public.  A 
call  was  made  for  them  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  was  tabled  by  the  Republican 
party.  A  request  made  by  the  recorder  of  that  council,  of  Mr.  Stanton,  to  allow  him  to  have 
the  proceedings  made  up  in  proper  form,  was  refused  in  a  most  rude  and  insulting  manner, 
and  the  papers  have  never  been  allowed  to  leave  his  possession  since. 

Now,  Judge,  for  your  especial  benefit,  I  will  relate  the  history  of  that  important  event,  that 
you  may,  if  you  will,  do  justice  to  all  concerned. 

The  council  of  war  consisted  of 


Brig.-Gen.  W.  F.  Smith, 

“  Barnard, 

Blenker, 

Naglee. 

McClellan  on  the 


U 


Brig.-Gen.  Sumner,  Brig.-Gen.  McCall, 

“  McDowell,  “  Heintzelman, 

“  Franklin,  “  Keyes, 

“  F.  J.  Porter,  “  A.  Porter, 

Each  entitled  to  but  “  one  star.”  It  was  called  together  by  order  of  Gen. 
night  of  March  7th,  1802,  to  convene  at  10  A.  M.  on  the  following  day. 

Gen.  McClellan  came  into  the  council  room  at  the  hour  appointed,  and,  placing  on  the  table 
a  large  map,  explained  his  proposed  Peninsular  Campaign,  which  before  this  time  I  believe  to 
have  been  known  to  no  one  present  excepting  Gen.  Franklin  and  probably  Fitz  J.  Porter. 
Upon  retiring,  he  left  upon  the  table,  for  the  consideration  of  the  council,  the  following 
inquiries : — 

I.  Whether  it  is  advisable  that  the  base  of  operations  shall  be  changed,  the  transportation 
being  ready  at  Annapolis  in  all  of  next  week. 

II.  Whether  it  is  better  to  make  an  advance  to  the  front  before  changing  the  base,  should 
such  a  change  be  determined  upon. 

III.  Whether  a  forward  movement,  with  the  object  of  destroying  the  river  batteries,  is 
advisable,  and  when  it  can  be  commenced,  and  whether  the  naval  force,  with  the  assistance  of 
the  Ericsson  battery,  can  alone  accomplish  that  object. 

After  a  session  of  three  hours,  the  council  were  summoned  to  appear  before  the  President. 
He  advised  them  that  he  was  quite  unwell  and  exceedingly  nervous,  that  the  pressure  had 
been  intense  against  Gen.  McClellan.  He  expressed  himself  gratified  to  have  the  opportunity 
to  see  and  know  the  officers  of  the  army,  and  to  be  instructed  by  them  in  regard  to  army 
matters,  which  were  to  him  very  incomprehensible. 

I  informed  him  that,  as  recorder  of  the  council  of  war  which  had  held  its  session  by  order 
of  Gen.  McClellan,  I  would  advise  him  of  the  result  of  its  proceedings,  and  then  read  them  to 
him.  “  What,’’  said  he,  “  have  the  council  decided  by  a  vote  of  eight  to  four — two  to  one — 
in  favor  of  the  Peninsular  Campaign  ?”  He  then  asked  many  questions  in  regard  to  the  same, 
until  Mr.  Stanton  came  in,  and  I  proposed  to  read  the  proceedings  to  him.  He  replied,  “Give 
me  the  papers,  I’ll  read  them  myself,”  and,  after  reading  them  over  and  preparing  his  notes, 
he,  as  you  say,  “put  them  (the  council)  through  the  strict  course  of  examination”  which  you 
refer  to.  This  examination,  made  for  the  purpose  of  neutralizing  the  effect  of  the  decision  of 
the.  council  of  war  on  the  mind  of  the  President,  and  thus  of  carrying  out  the  objects  of  those 
who  had  been  insisting  upon  the  removal  of  Gen.  McClellan,  lasted  for  four  or  five  hours, 
during  which  time  it  was  only  interrupted  by  an  occasional  expression  of  the  President,  indi¬ 
cating  his  satisfaction  and  gratification  at  the  many  explanations  of  military  movements  con¬ 
templated,  and  which  he  had  not  before  been  able  to  comprehend. 

It  was  now  getting  dark.  Mr.  Stanton’s  questions  indicated  approaching  exhaustion,  and 
finding  there  was  a  silence  which  called  for  a  cessation  of  hostilities  on  his  part  for  the  night, 
Mr.  Lincoln  expressed  himself  highly  gratified  with  the  interview,  said  he  was  impressed  with 
the  earnestness  and  intelligence  of  the  officers  present,  and  that  he  had  every  confidence  in 

them.  He  was  now  determined  not  to  remove  Gen.  McClellan,  as  he  had  promised  to  do,  but 
that  he  should  make  his  campaign,  as  approved  by  the  council  of  war,  under  restrictions, 
which  he  would  make  known  on  the  following  morning,  at  ten  o’clock,  when  he  desired  the 
presence  of  all  of  the  officers  of  the  council,  and  until  after  which  time  he  desired  that  none 
of  them  should  leave  the  city. 

Before  leaving  the  President,  the  Recorder  of  the  Council  approached  the  Secretary,  and 
said  :  “  If  you  please,  Mr.  Stanton,  permit  me  to  have  the  proceedings  of  the  Council  of  War 
that  they  may  be  copied  in  a  fair  hand,  and  Gen.  Sumner,  the  President  of  the  Council,  will 
sign  them,  the  Recorder  will  sign  them,  and  they  will  then  be  in  proper  form.”  “  I’m  just  as 
good  a  judge  of  the  form  as  you  are,”  was  the  reply  of  your  friend. 

Other  incivilities  have  been  attempted  by  Mr.  Stanton  towards  me,  the  manner  and  result 
of  which  he  has  neither  forgotten  nor  forgiven,  and  which  he  may  relate  to  you  whenever  he 
may  feel  so  disposed. 

On  the  following  morning  at  the  appointed  hour,  when  all  of  the  officers  of  the  Council  of 
War  had  assembled,  Mr.  Lincoln  said,  “I  have  slept  better  than  for  two  weeks.  I  feel  re¬ 
lieved  of  an  immense  responsibility.  I  have  determined  upon  the  following  programme” — 
which  he  submitted  verbally,  and  which  was  substantially  as  follows : — 

“I  will  permit  Gen.  McClellan  to  carry  out  his  campaign.  He  shall  leave  sufficient  force 
to  defend  the  works  before  Washington.  He  shall  embark  50,000  men  from  Annapolis,  and 

then,  unless  the  batteries  on  the  Potomac,  which  you  assure  me  will  necessarily  be  abandoned, 


3 


are  withdrawn  or  silenced,  I  shall  reserve  my  authority  to  embark  other  troops.”  He  then 
said,  “  I  have  determined  to  divide  Gen.  McClellan’s  army  into  four  corps,  and  I  shall  appoint 
the  commanders  of  them.”  And  afterwards  he  promoted  the  four  officers  who  had  opposed 
Gen.  McClellan’s  campaign,  three  of  whom  he  appointed  to  the  command  of  corps,  and,  with 
the  exception  of  Gens.  Franklin  and  Smith,  who  have  been  the  subjects  of  constant  annoy¬ 
ance  and  indignities  since,  the  others  have  all  been  dismissed  from  the  army. 

The  Peninsular  campaign  was  proposed  by  Gen.  McClellan  whilst  commander-in-chief  of 
the  armies  of  the  United  States,  and  was  intended  to  be  made  with  the  forces  then  under  his 
command  in  Eastern  Virginia,  estimated  at  over  200,000  men.  It  was  so  accepted  by  the 
President,  and  the  movement  was  commenced  upon  that  basis.  Gen.  McClellan  had  scarcely 
left  Washington  to  take  the  field,  when  the  Secretary  of  War  relieved  him  of  all  the  armies 
not  under  his,  General  McClellan’s,  immediate  command,  and  assumed  command  of  them 
himself.  The  troops  left  in  northeastern  Virginia  were  placed  under  the  command  of 
McDowell,  Banks,  Fremont,  and  Sigel,  each  being  independent  of  tihe  other,  and  of  General 
McClellan,  and  all  subject  to  the  order  of  Mr.  Stanton.  Whilst  the  above  division  of  our 
army  was  taking  place,  the  Confederates  concentrated  theirs  until,  on  the  26th  day  of  June, 
Gen.  McClellan  found  himself  before  Richmond  with  85,000  men  (including  McCall’s  division), 
and  was  attacked  by  the  concentrated  Confederate  force  of  175,000  at  the  very  moment  when 
McDowell,  under  protest,  withdrew  his  assistance  from  McClellan,  by  the  orders  of  the  Pre¬ 
sident  and  Secretary  of  War. 

The  Campaign  under  General  Grant  did  not  commence  until  the  4th  of  May,  1864.  That  of 
Chancellorsville,  in  which  the  casualties  were  estimated  at  30,000  men,  and  in  which,  but 
for  the  providential  killing  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  our  army  would  have  been  annihilated,  was 
planned  by  the  President  and  Gen.  Hooker,  or,  to  use  the  President’s  own  words,  by  “Joe 
and  I,”  of  which  the  Secretary  of  War  and  General  Halleck  were  kept  profoundly  ignorant, 
and  was  not  commenced  until  May  2,  1863;  whilst  that  of  the  Peninsula,  for  the  delay  of 
which  Gen.  McClellan  was  so  much  censured,  was  commenced  on  the  25th  of  March,  1862, 
forty  days  in  advance  of  either  of  the  others. 

Why  this  bitter  enmity  and  persecution  of  General  McClellan,  why  in  the  beginning  of 
March  was  the  President  pressed  to  death  to  remove  him,  even  before  he  had  made  his  first 
trial  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac?  Why  did  a  distinguished  member  of  the 
Senate  on  the  17th  of  March,  write  to  me :  “The  cry  against  McClellan  is  increasing;  every 
effort  is  being  made  to  crush  him”?  What  possible  chance  had  General  McClellan  to  succeed, 
when  his  own  government  did  every  thing  in  their  power  to  embarrass  his  movements,  and 
break  him  down?  One  would  think  his  task  sufficiently  onerous,  laborious,  and  responsible, 
when,  without  experience,  after  the  first  disastrous  rout  at  Bull  Run,  he  reorganized  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  and  was  preparing  to  fight  them  without  the  additional  convic¬ 
tion  being  forced  upon  him  at  every  step  that  his  own  government  was  determined  “  to 
crush  him.” 

Judge,  you  and  I  met  within  ten  days  after  the  dreadful  battles  before  Richmond.  You 
attacked  Gen.  McClellan  with  a  bitterness  and  feeling  that  ill  became  a  Christian  gentleman. 
I  then  begged  you  not  to  break  down  Gen.  McClellan  until  you  had  given  him  a  lair  trial,  and 
until  you  had  found  a  better  man,  and  challenged  you  to  name  a  better  general.  I  now  do 
the  same  thing,  and  appeal  to  the  record  of  the  past  thirty  months  and  to  the  rivers  of  blood 
that  have  flown  since  to  sustain  what  I  then  asserted.  I  refer  you  to  the  opinions  of  foreign 
officers,  and  I  assure  you  that  among  the  old  officers  of  the  army  I  shall  be  fully  sustained. 

The  preference  of  Gen.  McClellan  for  the  Peninsular  campaign  and  the  condemnation  of 
the  President’s  plan  have  been  fully  sustained.  The  families  and  friends  of  the  130,000  men 
lost  south  of  the  Rapidan  since  the  4th  of  May  last  proclaim  it  every where.  Mr.  Stanton 
told  the  country,  at  that  time,  he  had  a  hundred  thousand  men  more  than  he  wanted,  and  now 
he  tells  you  he  wants  a  hundred  thousand  more  men. 


General  Grant  crossed  the  Rapidan  with  an  army  variously  estimated  from  one 

hundred  and  eighty  thousand  to  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  120,000 

He  afterwards  added  Butler’s  .......  40,000 

He  was  reinforced  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  45,000 


Making,  exclusive  of  Sigel’s  30,000  .......  205,000 

—  On  the  1st  of  September  our  forces  were  estimated,  exclusive  of  Sheridan’s  30,000,  at  50,000 

Gen.  Lee  had  on  the  Rapidan,  after  he  had  concentrated  his  army  .  .  85,000 

Beauregard  joined  him  at  Richmond  with  his  forces  from  the  South,  which,  with 

those  near  Petersburg,  amounted  to  .....  30,000 

Breckinridge  brought  ........  10,000 

And  Lee  was  reinforced  probably  .......  30,000 


Making  in  all  .........  155,000 

On  the  1st  of  September  his  forces  were  estimated,  at  Richmond,  at  .  .  45,000 

Exclusive  of  Early’s  command  .......  30,000 

Showing  the  discharges  and  loss  from  Grant  to  be  .  .  .  150,000 

And  that  of  Lee  to  be  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  85,000 


4 


Judge  Kelley,  were  the  records  of  the  Council  of  War,  and  that  of  “the  strict  course' of 
examination”  made  by  Mr.  Stanton,  indicating  the  very  difficulties  and  dreadful  losses  Gen. 
Grant  has  lately  sustained,  ever  placed  before  him  ?  And  why  not?  And  who  is  responsible 
for  the  100,000  men  unnecessarily  and  wickedly  sacrificed  south  of  the  Rapidan,  in  the 
experiment  made  to  prove  that  Gen.  McClellan  and  the  Council  of  War  were  wrong,  and  that 
the  President’s  plan  was  right? 

The  army  of  the  United  States,  as  you  found  it  at  the  commencement  of  this  war,  was 
composed  of  a  high-toned,  intelligent,  honorable,  gallant  set  of  men,  fully  equal  to  the  con¬ 
test  before  them  ;  they  had  always  studiously  avoided  all  political  connections  ;  many  of  them 
had  been  thirty  years  in  the  service  of  their  country,  and  had  never  voted.  They  held  their 
country  and  the  honor  and  integrity  of  it  before  every  other  consideration.  Had  a  rule  been 
adopted  requiring  that  no  political  subject  should  be  introduced  into  the  army,  but  that  all 
political  rights  should  be  respected,  and  had  army  officers  only  been  held  responsible  for  the 
conduct  of  the  war,  it  would  have  terminated  long  ago. 

Why  have  McClellan,  and  Sedgwick,- and  McPherson,  and  Bayard,  and  Franklin,  and 
Buell,  and  Meade,  and  Averill,  and  the  Porters,  and  Abercrombie,  and  French,  and  Gilmore, 
and  Thomas,  and  W.  F.  Smith,  and  Brooks,  and  Sykes,  and  Newton,  and  a  score  of  other 
general  officers,  with  hundreds,  if  not  thousands,  of  officers  of  an  inferior  grade,  been  offended 
and  held  back,  and  many  of  them  dismissed  from  the  army  without  a  word  of  explanation,  an 
arbitrary  act  unknown  in  Great  Britain,  whilst  Pope,  and  Burnside,  and  Hooker,  and  Butler, 
and  Hunter,  and  Banks,  and  Sigel,  and  Sickels,  and  Foster,  and  Schenck,  and  Wallace,  and 
Busteed,  and  Milroy,  and  hundreds  of  others,  certainly  no  better  than  the  former,  have  been 
preferred?  Why  was  Gen.  Stone,  than  whom  there  is  not  a  more  loyal  man,  and  accom¬ 
plished  gentleman,  and  gallant  soldier  in  the  country,  confined  in  prison  for  fifteen  months? 
And  when  released  by  an  act  of  Congress,  why  was  it  that  neither  the  President,  nor  Secre¬ 
tary  of  War,  nor  Secretary  of  State,  or  other  persons  at  Washington  would  assent  to  any 
knowledge  or  any  participation  in  the  arrest  ?  Such  outrages  are  calculated  to  break  down 
the  honor  and  esprit  du  corps  of  any  army,  and  all  have  looked  on  with  disgust,  and  horror,  and 
pain  at  the  shameful  injustice  and  outrages  that  have  been  continually  heaped  upon  so  many 
of  their  old  friends  and  comrades  in  arms,  whom  they  know  incapable  of  an  ungentlemanly, 
dishonorable,  unsoldierly,  or  disloyal  act. 

Why  did  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  investigate  and  falsify  with  such  nice 
precision  the  conduct  of  McClellan  and  his  friends,  and  overlook  the  volumes  of  charges 
filed  in  the  War  Department  against  Fremont,  and  Sigel,  and  Hunter,  and  others,  and 
entirely  overlook  the  immense  slaughter  at  Chancellorsville,  and  Fredericksburg,  and  south 
of  the  Rapidan  ?  Why  did  a  secret  political  inquisition,  with  no  other  pretext  than  that 
they  suspected  him  of  political  ambition,  sit  over  five  hundred  days  and  manufacture  over 
seventeen  hundred  pages  of  ex  parte  testimony  against  a  young  officer,  a  Christian  gentleman, 
an  honest  man,  who,  heaven  only  knows,  never  had  but  one  purpose  and  that  to  serve  his 
country  and  his  God  ? 

You  know,  Judge,  that  whilst  in  Washington  General  McClellan  studiously  avoided  all 
political  association,  and  to  such  an  extent  that  many  of  his  friends  of  both  parties  were 
much  offended. 

The  first  knowledge  that  I  ever  had  of  any  political  ambition  on  his  part  was  after  he  had 
been  retired  from  active  service  and  sent  in  disgrace  to  New  Jersey,  and  this  was  after  his 
fitness  for  the  succession  had  been  discovered  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  the  people  had  signified 
their  affection  for  him.  His  letters  and  orders  have  been  called  political,  but  they  were  emi¬ 
nently  proper,  and  refer  entirely  to  the  military  policy  of  the  country.  But,  Judge,  suppose 
we  admit  that  General  McClellan  had  an  ambition  to  be  President  of  the  United  States,  was 
it  not  a  laudable  ambition,  and  is  there  any  impropriety  in  it?  Is  the  field  not  open  to  him 
as  well  as  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  or  Mr.  Fremont,  or  Mr.  Chase,  or  the  many  others  infinitely  his 
inferiors  ? 

So  far  as  the  objections  to  his  military  qualifications  are  concerned  we  have  only  to  remind 
you  that,  within  the  last  sixty  days,  a  confidential  friend  of  the  President  was  sent  to  offer 
him  one  of  the  most  important  commands  of  the  army.  But  this  proposition  was  coupled 
with  the  most  dishonoralile  condition  that  he  should  decline  to  be  a  candidate  for  the  Presi¬ 
dency.  General  McClellan  restrained  his  indignation,  and  replied  to  the  bearer  of  the  message, 
“  Go  back  to  Washington,  and  say  to  the  President  for  me,  that  when  I  receive  my  official 
written  orders  he  shall  have  my  answer.” 

Beware,  Judge,  of  the  intemperate  abuse  of  your  political  opponents,  as  proud  and  loyal 
as  you  are,  who  would  rather  see  the  Continent  of  America  sink  into  the  ocean,  with  all  that 
dwells  upon  it,  than  see  our  nationality  destroyed;  who  will  not  endure  this  constant  usurpa¬ 
tion  of  authority  and  encroachment  upon  their  rights,  and  whom  you  may  drive  into  a  dreadful 
conflict,  in  which  the  abolitionist  and  the  negro  may  find  themselves  arrayed  against  all  who 
will  unitedly  stand,  hand  in  hand,  and  shoulder  to  shoulder,  in  defence  of  the  Constitution 
and  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  land. 

Very  respectfully, 

HENRY  M.  NAGLEE. 


To  Hon.  WILLIAM  D.  KELLEY, 


Philadelphia. 


Second  Chapter  from  the  Secret  History  of  the  War. 


Philadelphia,  October  6,  1864. 

My  Dear  Sir:  I  once  went  hunting,  and  fired  at  a  mischievous,  chattering  chipmunck,  and 
found  when  the  smoke  had  cleared  away,  that  the  chipmunck,  although  badly  wounded,  made 
a  great  pretence  that  he  was  not  hurt  at  all.  But,  strange  to  say,  when  firing  at  the  lesser 
game,  I  had  hit  a  fox,  and  that  fox,  one  of  the  most  cunning,  destructive  animals  that  had 
ever  infested  the  neighborhood.  Would  you  believe  it,  I  never  stopped  to  listen  to  the  chip¬ 
munck,  but  loaded  again  for  the  fox. 

Now,  Judge,  the  moral :  Without  a  word  or  an  act  on  my  part  tft  justify  it,  you  attacked 
me,  and  I  responded  ;  although  winged,  you  declared  you  are  not  hurt,  but  the  President  and 
Secretary,  I  am  informed,  are  hurt,  the  latter  mortally;  the  former  so  badly  hurt  that 
I  shall  let  you  flutter  until  I  try  another  load.  Look  on,  Judge,  be  cpiiet;  await  your  time  ;  I 
have  ammunition  for  both  the  fox  and  the  chipmunck. 

In  the  Press,  the  North  American,  and  the  Inquirer,  and  in  all  of  the  Republican  news¬ 
papers  of  the  country,  I  have  found  the  following: — 

GENERAL  NAGLEE’S  LETTER. 

ONE  OF  HIS  STATEMENTS  ABOUT  PRESIDENT  LINCOLN  AUTHORITATIVELY  DENIED. 

From  the  National  Republican  ( official ) ,  Oct.  3. 

“The  copperhead  press  of  the  country  are  giving  circulation  to  a  letter  addressed  by  General 
Naglee  to  Hon.  William  D.  Kelley,  of  Philadelphia,  in  which  the  author,  speaking  of  General 
McClellan,  makes  the  following  statement : — • 

‘So  far  as  the  objections  to  his  military  qualifications  are  concerned,  I  have  only  to  remind 
you  that,  within  the  last  sixty  days,  a  confidential  friend  of  the  President  was  sent  to  offer 
him  one  of  the  most  important  commands  of  the  army.  But  this  proposition  was  coupled 
with  the  most  dishonorable  condition — that  he  should  decline  to  be  a  candidate  for  the  Presi¬ 
dency.  General  McClellan  restrained  his  indignation,  and  replied  to  the  bearer  of  the  message, 
“  Go  back  to  Washington,  and  say  to  the  President  for  me,  that  when  I  receive  my  official 
written  orders,  he  shall  have  my  answer.”  ’ 

“We  are  authorized  to  say  that  the  President  has  no  recollection  of  sending  any  message 
or  messenger  to  General  McClellan,  or  of  receiving  any  from  him,  at  any  time  since  he  was 
relieved  of  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  certainly  none  such  as  mentioned 
in  the  published  letter  of  General  Naglee.  If  the  President  sent  a  message  in  writing,  the 
writing  can  be  produced ;  if  a  messenger,  he  can  be  named.  Let  either  be  done  if  it  can.” 

To  this  I  answer,  that  before  the  assembling  of  the  Chicago  Convention,  about  the  middle 
of  August,  the  President  sent  one  of  his  old  and  confidential  friends  to  propose  to  McClellan, 
that  if  he  would  decline  to  be  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency  before  the  Chicago  Convention, 
and  would  consent  to  throw  the  weight  of  his  influence,  with  the  Democratic  party,  in  favor 
of  the  Republican  nominee,  he  should  have  any  position,  civil  or  military,  in  the  gift  of  the 
President  when  re-elected,  and  that  the  whole  influence  of  the  next  Administration  should  be 
thrown  in  his  {McClellan1  s)  favor  for  the  succession. 

Pardon  me,  Judge,  but  hold  still  just  one  moment  longer,  that  I  may  inform  you,  that  prior 
to  this,  there  was  a  written  correspondence  between  the  son  of  this  confidential  old  friend  of 
the  President,  and  a  prominent  Democrat,  making  substantially  the  same  proposition.  Now, 
in  connection  with  the  above,  let  me  call  the  attention  of  your  friends  to  the  following  extract, 
from  the  published  speech  of  the  Hon.  Montgomery  Blair,  made  since  my  letter  to  you  of  the 
27th  of  September,  was  written: — 

“  On  his  (Yallandigham’s)  motion,  every  voice  that  had  been  raised  to  fury  against  the 
nomination  of^IcClellan  was  silenced,  and  the  vote  in  his  favor  made  unanimous.  There  was 
a  potent  spell  in  his  voice  that  made  ‘  a  cessation  of  hostilities,’  ‘  a  Convention  of  the  States,’  ’ 
of  course  as  equals  and  independent,  and  a  quondam  chief  of  the  Federal  army — -(one  whom 
to  the  last  I  believed  to  be  true  to  the  cause  in  which  his  country  is  embarked,  and,  I  may  add, 
whom  the  President  held  to  be  patriotic,  and  had  concerted  with  General  Grant  to  bring 
again  into  the  field  as  his  adjunct,  if  he  turned  his  bad  on  the  proposals  of  the  peace  junto 
at  Chicago) — to  lead  the  last  assault  pressed  by  the  Southern  conspirators,  countenanced  by 
foreign  Powers,  against  the  institutions  of  the  country.” 

Let  us  rejoice.  There  is  some  hope  for  our  country.  Let  us  rejoice  that  we  have  found 
one  honest  man,  one  who  would  not  sell  himself,  and  betray  his  country,  and  who,  amidst  the 
most  outrageous  persecution  that  ever  a  strong  government  inflicted  upon  a  single,  unsup¬ 
ported,  inexperienced  young  officer,  had  the  courage  to  resent  a  disgraceful  bribe  and  insult. 


2 


Yon  have  affirmed  and  re-affirmed,  that  General  McClellan  had  no  plan,  and  that  finally 
about  the  end  of  February  he  had,  to  use  your  own  words,  exhausted  the  President’s  stock  of 
patience ;  but  that  the  President  had  in  the  kindness  of  his  heart  determined  to  give  Gen. 
McClellan  a  chance  to  redeem  himself  from  utter  ridicule,  and  had  given  him  ten  days  in  which 
to  propose  a  plausible  plan  of  a  campaign.  It  was  then  you  said  “he  had  no  plan,  and  that 
when  several  of  the  promised  ten  days  had  passed  he  was  still  without  a  plan.”  You  further 
say  that  General  Naglee  received  a  communication  from  a  Democratic  senator,  Mr.  Latham, 
of  California,  which  let  him  (Gen.  Naglee)  know  that  General  McClellan  was  in  danger  of 
removal,  because  he  had  stipulated  to  submit  apian  of  campaign  “within  a  certain  number  of 
days,  and  would  be  removed  if  he  did  not,  and  requested”  him  (Naglee)  “to  hasten  to  Wash¬ 
ington.”  And  now,  Judge,  listen  to  the  truth.  No  doubt,  having  indulged  so  freely  in  fiction, 
the  truth  will  be  a  little  distasteful  to  you,  but,  as  a  favor  to  me,  listen  to  it  until  I  have  dene, 
after  which,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  you  may  resume  your  natural  inclinations. 

First,  then,  for  the  purpose  of  falsifying  your  declarations,  read  the  following : — 

Executive  Mansion,  } 

*  -  Washington,  Feb.  3,  1862.  j 

My  Dear  Sir:  You  and  I  have  distinct  and  different  plans  for  a  movement  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  ;  yours  to  be  done  by  the  Chesapeake,  up  the  Eappahannock  to  Urbana,  and 
across  land  to  the  terminus  of  the  railroad  on  the  York  River;  mine  to  move  directly  to  a 
*  point  on  the  railroad  southwest  of  Manassas. 

If  you  will  give  satisfactory  answers  to  the  following  questions,  I  shall  gladly  yield  my  plan 
to  yours : 

1st.  Does  not  your  plan  involve  a  greatly  larger  expenditure  of  time  and  money  than 
mine  ? 

2d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  certain  by  your  plan  than  mine? 

3d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  valuable  by  your  plan  than  mine  ? 

4th.  In  fact,  would  it  not  be  less  valuable  in  this  :  that  it  would  break  no  great  line  of  the 
enemy’s  communications,  while  mine  would  ? 

5th.  In  case  of  disaster,  would  not  a  retreat  be  more  difficult  by  your  plan  than  mine  ? 

Yours,  truly,  Abraham  Lincoln. 

Major-General  McClellan. 

And  for  the  further  refutation  and  falsification  of  what  you  have  said,  I  hereby  assert  what 
I  know  to  be  true.  During  the  month  of  January,  1862,  General  McClellan  had  been  very 
ill.  The  President  became  very  restive  under  the  outside  pressure  which  demanded,  through 
the  Republican  press,  that  the  army  should  “  on  to  Richmond,”  and  was  about  to  consent  to 
some  movement  proposed  by  General  McDowell.  On  hearing  this,  General  McClellan  arose 
from  his  sick  bed  and  proceeded  to  the  Presidential  mansion,  there  to  join  the  President  and 
his  Cabinet,  who  had  been  assembled  to  meet  him.  He  was  asked  by  the  President  “to  give 
his  plan  of  campaign .”  He  hesitated  for  a  moment,  during  which  he  remembered  that  all 
information  furnished  to  the  cabinet  found  its  way  to  the  confidential  friends  of  some  of  them, 
and  thence  by  the  multitude  of  spies  that  infested  the  War  and  other  Departments  it  was 
forthwith  communicated  to  the  enemy,  and  he  replied,  that  he  would  do  so  if  the  President 
ordered  it,  but  as  the  President  must  know  how  immediately  such  information  wras  transmitted 
to  the  enemy,  he,  McClellan,  preferred  not  to  make  known  his  plan  of  campaign  to  the  Cabinet 
unless  the  President  should  order  it,  and  the  President  declined  to  make  the  order. 

Mr.  Chase  remarked  to  one  present,  that  if  Mac  persisted  in  thus  refusing  information,  he 
was  a  ruined  man. 

These  circumstances  occurred  in  January  and  on  February  3d.  Do  you  still  intend  to  reaffirm 
“that  McClellan  had  no  plan,  until  the  Democratic  Senators,  Mr.  Latham  and  Mr.  Rice,  and 
a  brigadier,  from  the  column  of  Joseph  Hooker,  concocted  one,  and  packed  a  council  of  war 
to  approve  of  it  ?”  on  the  8th  of  March  thereafter. 

Now,  Judge,  you  will  save  yourself  and  friends  much  confusion,  which  you  have  caused 
them  in  following  you,  if  you  would  read  the  orders  and  letters  that  have  been  published 
upon  all  of  these  military  subjects,  and  which  may  all  be  found  in  your  favorite  work  of  the 
report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  or  in  General  McClellan’s  Report, 
which  is  not  so  great  a  favorite  with  you.  You  evince,  again,  the  most  extraordinary  confu¬ 
sion  when  you  assert  that  the  President  gave  him  ten  days  to  find  a  plan,  and  confound  the 
orders  I  have  referred  to  with  the  following  order  of  the  President : — 

“  Executive  Mansion,  1 
“  Washington,  March  8,  1862.  j 

“  President's  General  War  Order,  No.  8/ 

*********** 

“  That  any  movement  as  aforesaid,  en  route  for  a  new  base  of  operations,  which  may  be 
ordered  by  the  Commander-in-chief,  and  which  may  be  intended  to  move  upon  the  Chesapeake 
Bay,  shall  begin  to  move  upon  the  bay  as  early  as  the  18th  of  March,  inst.,  and  the  General- 
in-chief  shall  be  responsible  that  it  moves  as  early  as  that  day. 

“  A.  Lincoln. 

“  L.  Thomas,  Adjutant  General.” 


% 


3 


In  which  you  will  observe,  he  did  not  order  General  McClellan  to  produce  a  plan  within  ten 
-days,  as  you  assert,  but  that  his  movement  should  commence  within  ten  days. 

Shifting  from  your  original  nomenclature,  you  now  assert  that  the  council  was  designated  as 
a  “  Council  of  Division  Commanders,”  and  that,  with  the  exception  of  General  Naglee,  it  was 
composed  of  Division  Generals.  Nowr,  sir,  as  usual,  you  falsify  the  record.  There  were  but 
nine  Division  officers  detailed,  and  it  was  convened  by  General  McClellan  as  a  “Council  of 
War.” 

Your  voluntary,  unprovoked  attack  made  upon  me  on  the  22d  ultimo  needs  no  denial,  for 
the  mere  fact  of  my  being  a  member  of  a  council  of  war  convened  by  order  of  Gen.  McClellan 
shows  of  itself  that  I  was  on  detached  duty  by  proper  authority,  over  which  neither  your 
friend  Mr.  Stanton  nor  Gen.  Hooker  had  any  control.  The  attack  upon  me  under  such  cir¬ 
cumstances,  as  well  as  your  assertion  that  Gen.  McClellan  had  no  plan  until  it  was  prepared 
for  him  by  Senators  Latham  and  Rice,  and  Gen.  Naglee,  on  the  8th  of  March,  1862,  in  face 
of  the  letters  and  orders  of  the  President  of  February  3  and  March  8,  herein  referred  to,  and 
long  since  subjects  of  constant  public  discussion,  exhibits  on  your  part  a  recklessness  of 
assertion  and  indifference  of  proper  self-respect  that  few  of  your  friends  will  comprehend,  and 
none  of  them  attempt  to  justify. 

Judge,  if  ever  a  question  of  veracity  comes  up  between  you  and  myself  we  alone  must 
settle  it,  and  you  must  not  attempt  to  shuffle  off  your  responsibility  and  place  it  upon  others, 
nor  to  protect  yourself  behind  such  “well-known  individuals”  as  *  Puffer”  Moore  and  George 
Hacker.  This  may  have  been  your  practice  heretofore,  and  you  may  have  so  acted  with  im¬ 
punity,  but  rest  assured  it  will  not  be  permitted  by  me. 

You  refer  to  some  great  surprise  that  General  McClellan  proposed  to  make  on  the  rebel 
line  at  Brentsville,  and  you  make  out,  no  doubt  to  your  satisfaction,  that  the  success  of 
the  surprise  depended  entirely  upon  a  certain  bridge  to  be  constructed  of  canal  boats, 
that  were  to  have  been  passed  into  the  Potomac  near  Harper’s  Ferry;  it  was  found,  you 
say,  when  the  movement  was  about  to  be  made,  that  the  outlet  lock  was  too  narrow 
for  the  boats.  Now,  this  surprise  of  Brentsville  may  be  entirely  clear  to  you  and  Senators 
Wade  and  Johnson,  but  to  myself  and  to  my  military  friends,  we  cannot  understand  how 
the  rebels  in  the  direction  of  Brentsville  could  have  been  surprised  by  any  movement  in 
the  direction  indicated  by  you  ;  but  I  suppose  that  that  is  not  important  with  you,  your 
real  object  being  only  to  relate  the  story  of  that  obstinate  canal  boat,  that  had  passed 
through  all  of  the  other  locks  upon  the  canal, -but  refused,  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  to 
pass  the  outlet-lock.  Did  it  ever  occur  to  you  that  an  empty  canal  boat,  in  the  hands 
of  thousands  of  men,  could  be  transferred  down  hill,  from  the  canal  to  the  river,  with 
but  little  difficulty,  and  that  there  might  have  been  some  other  reason  besides  the  one  assigned 
by  you  ?  But,  admitting  all  that  you  claim,  did  it  never  occur  to  you  that  it  is  not 
expected  that  the  entire  detail,  attending  the  movement  of  a  large  army,  is  to,  be  super¬ 
intended  by  the  Commander  thereof  in  person  ?  I  will  even  grant  you  that  in  theory  you 
are  right,  and  that  General  McClellan  should  not  have  had  officers  attached  to  his  staff 
who  neglected  to  use  every  precaution  to  prevent  failure.  But  be  charitable — don’t  fail  to 
remember  the  awful  disappointment  when  that  pontoon  train  failed  to  appear  upon  the  Rap¬ 
pahannock,  and  when  the  vials  of  wrath  were  poured,  not  upon  the  head  of  the  favorite  of 
your  party,  General  Burnside,  but  upon  those  of  Generals  Ilalleck,  Meigs,  and  Woodbury; 
and  again  be  charitable,  and  do  not  fail  to  remember  how  carefully  you  have  secreted  that 
more  terrible  blunder  than  ever  occurred  in  the  annals  of  this  or  any  other  war,  by  which  we 
have  no  less  than  twenty-three  monitors,  constructed  at  an  expense  of  over  twelve  millions  of 
dollars,  which,  with  their  armament,  it  was  determined  by  the  nice  calculations  of  the  naval 
engineers  brought  in  after  one  of  them  was  launched,  would  float  just  five  inches  under 
water.  Now,  Judge,  who  is  responsible  for  this?  Again  be  charitable.  But  do  not 
fail  to  remember  that  the  President  and  “Fighting  Joe  Hooker”  carefully  concealed  their 
plans  even  from  the  Comraander-in-Chief  and  the  Secretary  of  War  to  that  extent  that, 
whilst  the  battle  was  going  on  at  Chancellorsville,  I  was  informed  directly,  by  the  best  au¬ 
thority  in  the  premises,  “that  neither  General  Ilalleck  nor  the  Secretary  of  War  knew  more 
of  what  was  going  on  than  I  did,”  and  “  that  all  of  the  requisitions  made  during  the  prepara¬ 
tions  for  the  movement,  instead  of  going  through  the  ordinary  channels,  were  ordered  directly 
by  the  President.”  And  do  you  not  know  that,  to  the  present  hour,  the  country  has  never  been 
informed  that,  on  that  occasion,  Hooker  and  the  President,  with  the  best  army  that  was  ever 
got  together,  numbering  no  less  than  one  hundred  and  sixty-five  thousand  men,  fought  Gen. 
Lee,  with  an  army  of  fifty-seven  thousand — lost  thirty-five  thousand  men — were  completely 
routed,  and  to  such  an  extent  that,  as  I  said  before,  but  for  the  providential  killing  of  Stone¬ 
wall  Jackson,  our  army  would  have  been  annihilated?  Why  has  not  Mr.  Stanton  told  this  to 
the  families  of  the  thirty-five  thousand  so  unnecessarily  slaughtered,  instead  of  attempting  to 
console  them  with  the  pitiful  story  that  “  the  11th  Army  Corps  gave  way  in  confusion,”  and 
that  “but  one-third  of  Gen.  Hooker’s  army  had  been  brought  into  action  ?” 

Why  did  pot  your  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  exhaust  a  few  of  those  five  hun¬ 
dred  days,  and  a  portion  of  those  seventeen  hundred  pages,  especially  devoted  to  General 
McClellan,  upon  the  military  successes  of  that  great  leader,  General  Butler,  before  Petersburg, 


4 


where  six  thousand  of  his  men  were  marched  prisoners  into  Richmond — almost  without  his 
knowledge — he  and  Mr.  Stanton  coolly  assuring  the  country  that  there  had  been  a  great  fog, 
and  that  it  came  before  breakfast  ? 

Before  I  leave  your  friend,  Mr.  Stanton.  I  will  instance  another  evidence  of  his  treachery 
to  General  McClellan.  All  know  of  the  disasters  caused  by  the  interference  of  the  President 
and  Mr.  Stanton  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  necessary  to  have  a  victim,  and 
General  McClellan  was  selected  and  removed.  A  short  time  afterwards,  Pope  being  placed 
in  command,  failed  most  disastrously,  and  Washington  was  again  threatened.  The  President 
and  his  Cabinet  were  alarmed  to  that  extent  that  a  steamer  was  prepared  and  ready  to  assist 
in  their  escape.  With  earnest  entreaty  and  supplication,  McClellan  was  solicited  to  assume 
command  and  save  them  and  Washington.  He  consented — ignoring  the  solicitations  of  his 
friends,  who  desired  that  he  should  first  insist  upon  the  removal  of  Mr.  Stanton,  which  he 
utterly  refused,  replying  that  he  would  not  permit  any  personal  considerations  to  influence 
his  conduct  when  the  capital  was  in  such  imminent  danger.  He  then  accomplished  the 
greatest  military  success  of  the  war.  He  re-organized  the  demoralized  army  of  Pope  whilst 
on  the  march,  and  gained  the  glorious  victory  of  Antietam.  McClellan’s  star  was  again  in 
the  ascendant.  Mr.  Stanton  begged  forgiveness  for  the  past,  and  promised  his  devoted 
friendship  for  the  future. 

Again,  General  McClellan’s  trusting  nature  prevailed  over  the  advice  of  his  friends,  and  the 
treacherous  conduct  of  Mr.  Stanton  was  forgiven  by  General  McClellan,  only  to  be  again 
more  wickedly  betrayed  than  ever.  Washington  was  no  sooner  relieved,  and  the  President 
and  his  Cabinet  safe,  than,  by  the  influence  of  Mr.  Stanton,  General  McClellan  wras  again 
removed  from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  when  upon  the  verge  of  battle, 
and  ordered  into  retirement. 

You  call  up  the  ghosts  of  the  departed  soldiers.  Be  assured,  General  McClellan’s  sleep 
will  not  be  disturbed  by  them ;  but  what  must  be  the  broken  slumbers  of  those  who  are 
responsible  for  the  tens  of  thousands  lost  by  Pope,  and  Burnside,  and  Hooker,  in  attempting 
to  carry  out  what  the  President  called  his  “plan.”  and  the  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  lost 
since  the  4th  of  May,  south  of  the  Rapidan,  and  what  must  be  the  dreams  of  the  President 
who  could,  amidst  the  groans  of  the  dying  that  lay  upon  the  gory  field  of  Antietam,  call  for 
the  singing  of  a  ribald  song  ? 

In  times  like  these  we  want  some  other  than  the  wreak  and  vacillating  President  who  assured 
Mr.  Crittenden  and  the  patriots  that  accompanied  him  from  Kentucky  that  they  might  go 
home  and  inform  their  friends  that  he  would  not  violate  their  rights  and  interests  by  any 
proclamation  of  emancipation.  Before  these  assurances  could  be  transmitted  to  the  people 
of  Kentucky  his  promises  had  been  broken,  and  just  such  a  proclamation,  violating  all  these 
pledges,  was  issued. 

If  any  State  has  done  nobly,  and  earned  distinction  for  pure  patriotism  under  the  most 
trying,  dreadful  sufferings  of  this  war  in  which  a  whole  people  have  been  despoiled,  families 
embittered  against  families,  and  members  of  the  same  family  against  each  other  to  that  extent 
that  harmony  can  never  again  prevail,  it  is  the  State  of  Kentucky;  and  if  there  is  any  one 
State  that  should  have  had  influence  with  the  Administration,  it  is  that  State.  But  her 
voice,  amidst  the  din  and  blood  of  battle,  has  never  been  heard,  or,  if  heard  for  the  moment, 
it  has  been  soon  lost  under  the  influence  of  Massachusetts,  aided  by  the  demon  yells  of  radical 
men,  who  cried  out  extermination,  and  in  the  same  breath  proclaimed  a  higher  law  than  the 
Constitution,  which  they  denounce  as  a  covenant  only  with  hell. 

The  people  of  the  South  are  members  of  the  same  national  family  w7ith  us ;  they  must  be 
brought  back  by  continued  force,  if  they  will  not  come  back  by  consent.  But  we  must  respect 
their  rights,  whatever  they  are.  There  is  no  more  power  in  the  President  of  the  United  States  to 
control  whatever  right  of  property  there  may  remain  to  them  in  the  slave  on  the  day  on  which 
they  lay  down  their  arms,  than  there  is  in  the  sheriff  to  insist  that  the  poor  culprit,  who  has 
violated  the  law  in  the  most  outrageous  manner,  shall  be  deprived  of  his  food  or  his  clothing, 
prior  to  his  execution.  The  military  authority  of  the  President  during  the  existence  of  the 
war,  can  apply  only  to  personal  property  in  the  actual  possession  of  the  army,  and  all  military 
authority  ceases  the  moment  peace  is  restored,  and  the  only  authority  that  can  be  exercised 
over  the  same  from  the  moment  hostilities  cease,  is  lodged  in  the  Constitutions  and  laws  of  the 
States,  and  the  United  States,  whose  mandates  he,  by  the  Constitution,  is  bound  by  his  oath 
to  obey.  Y ery  respectfully,  &c., 

HENRY  M.  NAGLEE. 

Hon.  William  D.  Kelley,  Philadelphia. 


